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1. Determinism and the establishment of responsibility
The content of responsibility for acts committed against society in­
cluding those against the penal code as well, is fundamentally defined by 
the acceptance of the principles of the causal relationship and determinism 
prevailing also in the field of human behaviour. These basic theses of marx- 
ist philosophy may serve as theoretical basis for the administration of 
justice as well. The reason why all these may serve only and do not ac­
tually do can be explained by the fact that the theoretical bases of the ad­
ministration of justice in present Hungary are not fully in harmony with 
the principle of determinism. A lot of specialists of criminal sciences shy 
to apply the determinist principle concerning the administration of justice 
consistently either believing in indeterminism (rather rare occurance) 
or misunderstanding the idea of determinism and identifying it with the 
concept of mechanic determinism (the more frequent case). The question 
may be yet raised whether in case of accepting the principle of determinism 
consistently, is there any reason of stating criminal responsibility and 
whether the denial of the existence of the free will of the individual and 
the statement of the necessity for committing the crime, does not eliminate 
the theoretical bases of responsibility and may not acquit the offender 
from any punishment.
Before giving detailed answer to the questions raised we find it ratio­
nal to explain what the acceptance of the principle of indeterminism or 
the concept of the limited free will would represent in the fight against 
criminality and for the establishment of responsibility.
1. In such cases the search for the causes of crime might be partially 
or fully superfluous along with criminology as a whole. How could re­
search for the causes of crime have any meaning if we profess that crime is 
not fully determined by the causes, rather that besides the causes the 
free will of the individual may also have a role. Accepting this approach 
we may question whether it may be expected in the course of building up 
socialism that people could be trained for keeping to the requirements of 
society to a higher extent as people may behave as they want in the fu­
ture as well and develop in a way they choose. Depending on the relative 
free will of the individual, the number of crimes committed may “even-
tually” increase under any favorable conditions, even at the time commu­
nism is fully realized.
2. Not only the absolute free will yet the relative one may clearly 
lead to the conclusion that no laws exist in human behavior interrelating 
the past with the future, thus the prognosis may loose its meaning. There 
is no raison d’etre for any prediction either concerning the formation of 
criminality or the expected behavior of the individual. Neither can we 
predict the trend of development, so we cannot give any answer to the ques­
tion why the number of crimes is growing under capitalism and not in a 
socialist country, why do people commit more crimes in the USA than 
in our country, unless the answer is that people act as to their liking.
3. In case we do not accept the principle of determinism in the cri­
minal behaviour of people, we have to refute the possibility for crime pre­
vention as our measures applied cannot ensure even under optimal con­
ditions any prevention, as people’s will do not fully or partially depend 
on the phenomena of the external world. Only vengeance and retribution 
may have any justification as to any punishment, provided the effect of 
punishment has no interest for the administration of justice.
On the other hand, if we accept the existence of the principle of de­
terminism in criminal behaviour, the research for causes, prevention and 
prognosis turn to be important. All these may lessen the number of cri- 
mes and make it possible to realize the privailing regularities and promote 
the perfection of the penal system and the administration of justice.
The effort for putting into force the principle of determinism derives 
from social necessity. The followers of the criminological school called for al­
tering the fundamental principles for establishing responsibility in the 
course of growing efforts for penal reform in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. However, the struggle between determinism and indeterminism 
was settled with a theoretical compromise. The motivation of the First 
Amendment (1908) of the Penal Code provides for the clear conception of 
this compromise saying, “in the debate between determinism and inde­
terminism the draft takes stand for the free will but accepts the restric­
tion that the prevailing social conditions, the phisical, mental and moral 
stage of the offender may act as determinative factors in the volitional 
decision. We may conclude that the state has the possibility to influence 
not only the external behavior but also the formation of the internal moral 
development of the individual by altering the determinat ing factors.”1
This definition of the relative free will or partial determinism can be 
regarded as dominating among the specialists in criminal sciences at pre­
sent as well. I do not aim at demonstrating the history of the realization ol 
the two confronting ideologies and their struggle in the administration of 
justice of the capitalist countries or not even that of capitalist Hungary, 
as the materialist concept cannot be accepted as a necessity in a country 
where religion and idealism are raised to the rank of the official ideology. 
That is why I deal with the efforts only which came into the fore after the 
liberation of the country, when the marxist and the materialist ideas came 
to be realized.
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The possibility and need for the realization of the determinist con­
cept in the field of liability and in a narrower sense in the field of criminal 
liability was raised in the early 1960-s. Over this period monographies have 
been published one after the other by experts in several fields taking a 
decisive stand for the determination of human behavior and will and mak­
ing efforts to elaborate the theoretical basis for for liability including 
criminal liability.2 Although these authors expound their standpoints in 
different ways, they agree on regarding the adoption of the determinist 
concept as possible and necessary.
The following debates and the latest scientific views3 may lead to the 
conclusion that the general acceptance of the principle of determinism 
may come about concerning the establishment of responsibility sooner or 
later. One of the essential issues of the renewed efforts for a reform of the 
penal law is aiming at the modification of the theoretical basis for the 
establishment of responsibility, leading, of course, to the modification of 
several detailed items. But few accept the opinion expressed in Imre Bé- 
kćs candidate dissertation on the problem of culpability, as to which “the 
removal of one of the piliers of the dogmatic structure may undermine 
the whole system and the restauration of the equilibrum may call for the 
reorganisation of the whole construction.”4 There is no doubt that the 
consequent application of the principle of determinism would call for an 
essential modification in the present system of the administration of jus­
tice. Yet we have to make a difference between the approval of a theory 
respectively its acceptance as guiding pronciple and its application re­
spectively the extent of this. Experience shows that theories frequently 
serve as a guide for the practice as long as no adequate conditions are 
brought about for their realization. These conditions do not and cannot be 
brought about over night, yet gradually as a result of the social and tech­
no-scientific or technological progress. Accordingly, another system for 
establishing responsibility based on modified theoretical bases can be also 
gradually formed. Yet the acceptance of the principles and their official 
implementation may come about with the elaboration of a new law. A new 
penal may include theoretical requirements which are intended to be ef­
fectuated but gradually depending on certain conditions. Laszlć Viski 
puts it correctly in his doctoral dissertation that the penal law can be ela­
borated scientifically based on the concept of determinism only. This 
thesis also includes in a negative form that any penal institution not ba­
sed on this approach is not scientifically elaborated and its modification 
respectively alteretion is necessary.
Professor Eörsi’s work is the most frequently quoted, approved and 
criticized among the relevant publications. This may be explained partly 
by the fact that liability is the central theme of the monography, thus the 
problem has been subject of profound and comprehensive analysis. On the 
other hand it represents the “most consequent” determinism. This mono­
graphy like the rest of the studies on this topic discusses mainly the pro­
blem of blameworthyness and punishment, namely the fundamental 
questions of responsibility from the aspect of the determinist conception.
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The principle of determinism cannot be applied in fundamental theoretic­
al questions only, but also in system of punishment, the sentencing, the 
efficiency of punishment, as well as in after care. In the following parts I 
shall attempt to depict the possibility for applying the principle of deter­
minism in the fields mentioned above.
2. The distinction between responsibility and establishing responsibility
We may consider criminal responsibility as one form of responsibility 
in general. The clarification of the real meaning of responsibility in gener­
al may promote the deeper understanding of the essence of criminal re­
sponsibility and the establishment of responsibility. We often speak about 
responsibility in work and may add to the position of a senior official the 
word highly responsible. In widest meaning we understand under re­
sponsibility a certain obligation, based on which a person is responsible for 
something or somebody.5
We find an unusual definition of responsibility in Endre Bôcz’s study. 
As to him responsibility can be regarded as the relationship between the 
community interested in the act of the individual and the individual him­
self. Responsibility is an objective category independent from the individual 
deriving form the fact that the individual is a member of the community. 
This can be attributed to the individual’s sociability and the fact that the 
individual’s activity is not selfcentered, rather an element of the coopera­
tion with the fellowmen and as such its aim, reason, meaning and result 
are all interrelated and may influence the conditions for other people’s 
existence and activity as well as the efficiency of all these. “However, 
awareness of responsibility is not a precondition of responsibility rather 
the result of the realization of responsibility.
Accordingly, responsibility is not a category of morals or law, it is 
rather the interrelation of the community and the individual, deriving from 
the necessity of cooperation being a fundamental objective feature of hu­
man existence.”6
B6cz is right stating that responsibility expresses the interrelation be­
tween the individual and the community but 1 believe he overemphasizes 
the role of the community and so the reciprocal character of the relation is 
lessened. As a matter of fact, the expectations of the community, the so­
ciety appear in different norms independent from the acting individual in 
question, but this norms are elements of the external environment deter­
mining the individuals behaviour as well as the relation betwen the in­
dividual and society. In the course of the activity t he individual is getting 
aware of these norms and a sense for responsibility and a conscious re­
lation to the community develops. So responsibility is a general and con­
scious relation from the part of the individual as well, which may be expres­
sed in a positive or a negative form. We may speak about responsibility in a 
positive sense7 in case of a behaviour in conformity with the social requi­
rements and about a negative irresponsible conduct in case this disregards 
or differs from the norms.
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"  e may find a whole system of norms expressing the expectations of 
the community in the present society full of complexity. There may be 
certain norms to the violation of which society responds with blaming 
the individual only. These are mainly the moral norms. There are, how­
ever, norms the violation of which leadas to more grave consequences. The 
legal norms, such as the norms of labor law, civil law, penal law etc. come 
under this category. Consequently, we may speak about social, moral and 
legal responsibility as well as their varying forms (civil law, penal law etc.) 
and in case of norm violation the establishment of responsibility varies ac­
cordingly.
Each society and community prescribes not only the norms, the be­
haviour to lie followed, yet also the sanctions to be imposed in case of 
violation of the norms, on the other hand merits are rewarded, such as 
premium, medals and decorations, for the outstanding fulfilment of social 
expectations. The idea of responsibility includes from one hand the social 
requirements expressed in different norms, on the other hand the indivi­
duals relation to these norms, which may appear in behaviour answering 
the social requirements, or in a negative form, by irresponsible conduct 
violating the norms.8
From the above we may conclude that лее have to make a difference 
between the notion of responsibility and that of establishing responsibility 
or the possibility of establishing responsibility. Violating the norms is the 
bases for establishing responsibility, namely this may come about through 
irresponsible conduct. Thus the violation of norms does not lead to the 
establishment of responsibility, rather to the possibility of this.
As to the general approach in the relevant legal literature, the neglect 
of legal obligations is leading to legal responsibility and the individual vio- 
lating the norms is compelled to bear the sanctions for the misconduct. As 
an example I should like to mention the view of Leikina, representing the 
standpoint of the majority of soviet criminal lawyers.' ‘Responsibility is 
an obligation of the individual to subject himself to the measures defined 
bv the state in case of violating the social order.”9 We may also find the 
similar definition in Hungarian literature. So as to professor Kör si, “The 
legal responsibility means the possibility of the application of a repressive le­
gal sanction in case of culpable violation of obligations.”10 The idea is even 
more clearly formulated in the following sentence, “the group of illegal 
acts which lead or may lead to liability is called the violation of obliga­
tions;.”u  The difference between responsibility and establishing responsibil­
ity vanishes too, if we accept professor Földvâri’s standpoint. As to him, 
“responsibility is nothing but the endurance of the consequences of the 
value judgement about the conduct is question.”12
Péter SzilâgyVs remark concerning the standpoints mentioned above 
is correct, when saying that responsibility cannot depend on the establish­
ment of responsibility, it does exist quite independently and is not the 
consequence of a value judgement, even less is responsibility the enduran­
ce of certain consequences. It is rather a normative relation involving va­
lue judgement as well.13 Szilagyi also links responsibility to the norm vio-
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lation separating it only from establishing responsibility. Quoting his 
words, “provided the legal responsibility has come about in any form, it 
cannot be abolished by any future procedural obstacle. Sanctions, as con­
sequences of responsibility are not imposed in all cases. This, however, does 
not mean the lack of responsibility, only that of certain conditions (legal 
or phisical ones, such as the lack of the private criminal action or the es­
cape of the accused for establishing responsibility.“14
It is worth-while quoting Andräs Szabo’a words, “in criminal law 
responsibility always equals the establisment of responsibility, respectiv­
ely the statement that the conduct may be influenced by imposing for­
ce.”15 As to Andrâs Rzabô responsibility and establishing responsibility 
are analogous expressions in criminal law.
Doubtlessly, this use of expressions (namely replacing responsibil­
ity by the expression “establishing responsibility” or “calling to account”) 
looks back at a long past. Experts of criminal law do not seem to be con­
fused by this, they usually know what the rest wants to express, but in 
case we want to make the theoretical theses and principles of law clear to 
the whole population which is a special requirement concerning the penal 
law, we have to lay stress on the right use of notions. In  case if  ice identified 
responsibility with establishing responsibility, people would not carry any 
responsibility as long as they violated the norms. People would make declara­
tions about non-existent things by confirming to accept penal responsibil­
ity for being aware of the consequences of their deeds. Obviously crimin­
al responsibility exists not only in case people make false statement but 
also in case of true statements. The false statement makes it possible to 
establish the responsibility of the offender but dies not bring about res­
ponsibility.
Each individual being aware of the existing norms, their sanctions and 
the possibility of being called to account as a consequence of the violation of 
norms, disposes of criminal responsibility. Unless it was the case people 
acting in conformity with the norms and obeying the law would not be 
responsible, but only those who ignored and violated the norms. Hardly 
could we state that the majority of people is working without any respon­
sibility. As a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of the population 
is working with utmost responsibility and only a minority’s activity can 
be called irresponsible. That is why establishing of responsibility in a ne­
gative sense and imposing sanctions is necessitated against them.
In principle we could understand establishing responsibility as a re­
port on a socially useful activity among with appreciation, reward and dis­
tinction. In everyday language, however, establishing responsibility is 
always considered as the consequence of conduct violating the norms. That 
is why the procedure for asserting responsibility may be interpreted as 
measures to clarify how responsibility was realized in a concrete conduct 
and to prove whether this activity actually violated a certain penal norm 
and if so which one to be imposed out of the many sanctions.
In the following I intend to depict the interrelation between the prin­
ciple of determinism and establishing criminal responsibility.
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3. The theoretical foundations for establishing responsibility
Criminological research having been carried out so for and the reali­
zation of regularities in criminality may lead to the conclusion that human 
behaviour causing serious demage and danger to society is yet prevailing 
and likely will exist for long. Even in case the number of crimes commit­
ted is showing a dropping tendency we yet have to count with criminal 
acts in the long run. The formation of criminality, like any other pheno­
menon, is determined by the causes and conditions and the fact that cri­
minogenic prevail will lead to crimes in the future as it did in the past. Ac­
cepting determination in the criminal behaviour necessitates the revision 
of the essence and the aim of establishing responsibility and the eventual 
modification and rewording of the theoretical theses elaborated so far.
The efforts of professor Eörsi, F bidesi and Szabo for explaining the 
meaning and aim of establishing responsibility and for demonstrating that 
the scientific administration of justice can be brought about in this was 
only, launched a favourable process in the theory of penal law. At present 
more and more criminal lawyers take the stand against indeterminism 
and try  to adjust responsibility to the conception of t he full determination 
of the criminal conduct.16
As a matter of fact, the determinist concept meets with wide response. 
Some call it predeterminism respectively mechanic determinism and they 
believe, to refute these would undermine the idea of dialectic materialistic 
determinism. Lajos Bolyai Jr. attacked most vigorously the idea of apply­
ing the principle of determinism on criminal responsibility. As to him 
determinism eliminates the basis of responsibility and punishment may 
becone irrealistic, in case the offender could not have acted in a different 
way and the commitment of crime was unavoidable.17
György Âdâm e.g. calls Eörsi's determinist standpoint predetermi­
nism and considers it unsuitable for laying down the bases for responsibil­
ity.18 Imre Békés also has some reservations concerning connecting the 
principle of determinism with establishing responsibility. “Man is a°part 
in our present scientific image of the universe, yet the scientific reflection 
of man remains relatively independent compared to our image of the uni­
verse. The image created about man is a social image depicting the indi­
vidual’s social relations and tasks.
According to our conception of the universe man consumes nourish­
ment protein and carbohydrat while as to that about man he or she is 
having breakfast, lunch and dinner eating meat and cakes. Both images 
are true yet of different functions.
1 he lawyer s task is not to separate but to preserve the individual as 
a complete personality, even in case the scientific image formed is true, 
namely if the individual and its deeds may be determinated.
The question may arise whether man is but a puppet controlled by 
fate and all external and internal manifestations are the causative con­
sequences of the structure of personality inherited as well as the decisions 
brought about by the stimuli of the environment, or is man’s fate deter -
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mined from the birth to the last decision. The answer to these cannot be 
given based on science but rather on faith at present. The mechanic de­
terminism attributes an absolute validity to causality the same way the 
idea of predestination does to the determinating effect of God’s knowledge 
about the future.19” Imre Békés does not reject the possibility of the de­
termination in criminal behaviour, but concerning jurists he considers the 
old modeli of man disposing at least of relative free will to be accepted and 
not the new scientific image of man. It goes without saying that legal in 
his opinion institutions including the system for establishing responsibil­
ity have to be adjusted to the old modeli. This idea is even more clearly 
formulated in the following quotation: “Socialist criminal jurists having 
the suffisient theoretical knowledge must accept the philosophical thesis 
about the determination of human thought and have to admit its psycho­
logical foundation. However, dogmatic in present socialist criminal law 
accepts the psychological concept based on the fiction of the free will 
(inspite of rejecting the existence of the free will itself).20” Imre Békés is 
not alone accepting the concept of responsibility based on the fiction of 
the free will. Although taking stand for a consistent determinism, Géza 
Tokaji accepts the view formulated by Békés. Demonstrating and review­
ing different theories on responsibility he comes to the conclustion, that 
“responsibility cannot be solely deduced from the determination of past 
conduct fully excluding the free choice of the individual. We rather have 
to pay attention to the fact that the full determination of the past deeds is 
inadequatly reflected in the social consciousness as wel 1 as in the con­
sciousness of the individual. That is why people believe in the illusion of 
the free choice limited but to a certain extent by the determinating fac­
tors which could never fully eliminate it. Tn the some way as the incorrect 
reflection of one or other trait of reality in the consciousness did not prove 
always socially harmful during history, the illusion of the relative freedom 
of choice reflecting full determination inadequatly is likely to play a useful 
role for a long period of time, since the awareness of responsibility is 
built on that. However inadequate the foundation of the awareness of res­
ponsibility might be, the formation of this awareness creates the grounds 
in the personality on which the preventive role of the correctly imposed 
and implemented consequence of the criminal law can have its optimal 
effect.”21
The illusion of free choice has also a role in Fis&i’s conception, in 
laying the foundations of liability. Viski, however does not regard it as
the basis for establishing liability. As to him“ ........the illusion of free
choice is an illusion only in the sense of philosophy, in the sense of psyho- 
logy it is much more similar to reality than to mere delusion.”22 As to 
Viski’s explanation this can be attributed to the fact that according to 
our present knowledge the totality of the causes cannot be fully known, 
the chain of causality cannot be followed to the end. “The too far, indirect 
determinating factors, however, have a role in every action and for this 
reason the illusion is not unfounded, but the decision owing to the neces­
sary limits of the mental process is a reality of psycho-physiology and
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it is an illusion only if the human activity is regarded on the level of ab­
stractness and not on the level of practical life.
On the other hand, and this is the essential thing we do not have to 
stop on the level of the illusion of the freedom of choice in order to “pro­
tect” the notion of responsibility. We have no reason not to look behind 
the illusion and we do not have to deny that when evaluating the human 
act we do not find the acting person responsible because he did some­
thing else what he should have and could have done out because did what 
he had to i.e. because he is himself. The society evaluates a human being 
according to his qualities and his significance to the society.”23
We are in complete agreement with Viski’s opinion that there is really 
no need for building on illusions instead of reality. It is precisely the reali­
zation and admission of the reality that makes the real sense of the estab­
lishment of responsibility. The establishment of responsibility cannot 
have any other basis as the deed and the human being behind it as he is. 
The measures that are to determinate (or parting determinate) the per- 
patrator’s future behaviour toward the right direction have to fit to that. 
But it is the same thing — and rightly — on the opposite side, in the scope 
of responsible acts. By recognizing and rewarding in the scope of evaluat­
ing the behaviour that is useful for the society and also determinated, 
the society strives for making this type of conduct more frequent or per­
manent.
But let us see some basic arguments against the recognition of the 
principle of determination on the field of the establishment of criminal 
responsibility. The dominating conception is probably formulated by Ti- 
bor Lulcdcs in his study entitled “The formation of Our Concept of Criminal 
Law”, when speaking against the theoretical correctness of the relatively 
indeterminate loss of freedom sentence.” The basis of this idea, which dis­
penses of all our principles concerning the criminal act, culpability and 
punishment, is seen in the thesis that the human behaviour is determinat­
ed, while our present system of punishment is based on the ideas of the 
freedom of action, the freedom of free will. I must remark that our present 
system of punishment takes the ideas of marxism into consideration, only 
it takes the standpoint of the relative freedom of will. This is the reason 
why the institution of the bars of punishability are developed.”24
rI’he system of punishment, the establishment of criminal responsi­
bility, according to Lukâcs is built on the principles “of the relative free­
dom of will”, though the ideas of marxism are taken into consideration, 
too, the determination of the behaviour, however, is an alias thing, it is 
contradictory to the principles of the socialist penal law.
Bôlya, Jr. has similar views concerning the impossibility of the re­
conciliation of the establishment of criminal responsibility and the prin­
ciple of determinism, “ ........we do not find the foundations of responsi­
bility in determinism. While proving that we do not attempt to refute the 
thesis of determinism, since on the one hand it is problem of philosophy, 
and on the other hand we do not want to attack the thesis, we merely 
state that determinism and responsibility are phenomena having their effects
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in two different sphere and one of them cannot he derivated from the other. 
“Accepting determinism we regard it as general, a law that has is valid 
everywhere and in everything, it is necessary as air, it is present everywhere 
but unnoticed, it is an objective fact, but it is not manifest in institutions 
and it does not serve as basis to derivate thesises from it.”25
The study of Bolya, even only the quotes convey the impression that 
the principle of determinism as a philosophical thesis may be true but it 
cannot be put into effect in the sphere of liability in spite of the fact that 
it is a “law that valid everywhere.” According to Bolya, these concepts 
have nothing to do with each other. We find them “on different levels of 
the system of build-up and as liability is not defined by determinism, de­
terminism is not defined by liability.’’26 According to him, determinism 
should remain a thesis of philosophy and we should not try  to put it into 
reality, in institutions or use it to derivate new theses or in concreto apply 
it in the field of establishing criminal responsibility or responsibility in 
general, because in that case we necessarily have to give up either liability 
or determinism.27
The main accusation against establishing responsibility on the basis 
of the principle of determinism is that the subjective elements are not and 
cannot be taken into consideration, because from the point of view of 
determinism it is indifferent how the criminal act was “born’ “since it is 
determinated”, the important thing is that a harmful result is produced. 
And, the punishment is not applied because the perpetrator is guilty but 
for the future prevention.
In mv opinion the misinterpretation of the determinist liability is 
the most evident here. From the pattern of cusality it is clear that the culp­
able human behaviour is the result of the struggle of the conflicting motiv­
es, it is the manifestation of the perpetrator’s wrong, harmful views, 
emotions, perhaps psychical attitudes. The fact itself that the penal norm 
has been violated is not enough for the evaluation of behaviour violating 
the norm. On the basis of that the right preventive measures, the deter­
minates that would have advantageous effects in the future cannot be de­
cided. Clarifying the ways of the determination and answering the question 
of “how” that is asked by Bolya and others, is an absolute need to make 
it possible. The subjective and objective causes that produced the guilty 
behaviour have to be explored. I t is precisely the characteristics of the per­
petrator subject, the state of his consciousness, the psychical process of the 
volitional decision, the evaluation of the anticipated images connected 
to the displayed behaviour that are the basis which makes possible to de­
cide whether it is a penal sanction that is fit the best to influence the be­
haviour of the perpetrator and other members of the society or other 
means, measures are more suitable for that.
To establish responsibility is not possible without establishing whet­
her the perpetrator’s conduct violating the penal norm was reflected by 
his consciousness or not, and if it was, how was it a purpouseful act, or a 
faulty conduct of the perpetrator produced the harmful result. The ex­
amination the perpetrator’s awareness of responsibility is also indispen-
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sable. We agree with Tokaji that “awakening the consciousness creates 
the foundations in the personality on which the preventive role of the cor­
rectly imposed and executed consequences of penal law can have optimal 
effects,” but do not share the opinion according to which the awareness 
of responsibility is based on the illusion of the freedom of choice reflecting 
the complete determination inadequately. In my opinion the awareness of 
responsibility cannot be derived from the illusion of the freedom of choice 
but from the correct or less correct reflection of the reality surrounding us. 
The awareness of responsibility means that the individual becomes conscious 
of the existence of social evaluation of the relationship toward them, i.e. that 
obedience to the norms entails recognition, their violation entails legal detri­
ment. This obligation of giving account that exists for everyone means the 
psycho-social basis of the awareness of responsibility.
The awareness or sense of responsibility of course is not an inherited 
trait as stated by certain western authors.28 The awareness of responsibil­
ity develops during the ontogenetic evolution of the human being as a 
result of the environmental effects. Legal norms in general and the norms 
of penal law together with their consequences as the parts of the material 
world are reflected by human consciousness, and the awareness of respon­
sibility developing that way becomes an element of the personality, the 
consciousness of the human being.
The process of developing into a social being, into a subject of social 
obligations and rights, starts with the first moment of the individual life 
of the human being. A person gains certain knowledge in his childhood and 
learns certain norms that have effects in the community surrounding 
him, in a wider sense in the whole society. His behaviour is evaluated from 
the point of view of moral responsibility. That way the awareness of moral 
responsibility develops in him and it becomes a charasteristic of his per­
sonality. The awareness of moral responsibility, however couples with 
the awareness of legal responsibility since direct and indirect informations 
show the existence of norms the violation of which may entail grave coun- 
sequences, legal detriment.
Woundering the results of pedagogical and other sciences dealing 
with human behaviour, legislation regards 14 years as the age when the 
awareness of responsibility is developed and it can be considered as an ac­
tive factor of forming behaviour.
The awareness of criminal responsibility becomes a part of the per­
sonality in a different way with different people. With some people the 
due respect toward penal norms does not develop at all or precisely a 
negative value-judgement of them develops.
Concerning such persons, if, depending on enwiromental effects and 
conditions, they break the norms of criminal law, establishing criminal 
responsibility has the task of forming or evoke the consciousness of respon­
sibility at least to the extent that in the conflict of motivation the motives 
of duty should win against criminogenic ones and a volitional decision to 
follow the law should be born.We emphasize again that the establisment of 
criminal responsibility may have a favourable only on the personality of
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the perpetrator but also can strengthten or create the consciousness of 
responsibility in the individuals and that way it can be a determinant of 
lawabiding behaviour. The establishment of criminal responsibility there­
fore, by its consciousness-forming effects, is fit to promote the obedien­
ce to norms reflecting the interests of the ruling class, that of the society.
Although the establishment of criminal responsibility effects the con­
sciousness and the personality, those personality traits are examined pri­
marily that have been manifested in the criminal behaviour. These unfa­
vourable personality elements must be first of all corrected by calling to 
account. A different preventive measure has to be employed if the perpet­
rator purpousfully performed his act or he only disregarde the require­
ments of diligence. Again a different measure is needed if the criminal act 
is an incidental one, not the regular display of the personality or if it is a 
case of a hardened, habitual criminal.
The accusation, therefore, that the establisment of criminal respon­
sibility base on a determinist conception does not take into consideration 
the perpetrator’s subjective eharasteristics and that way it aims the intro­
duction of the strict liability system is unfounded.
Viski is perfectly right stating that the determinist conception does 
not compel us to give up the notions of responsibility, blameworthyness and 
culpability, on the contrary only it is fit to give the scientific explanation 
of these notions.29 It is true, of course, that they gain a different meaning 
if they are related to the principle of determinism and not to that of the 
free will. That way a person’s behaviour infringing a norm of criminal law 
does not qualify as a criminal offence because he had a free will to choose 
between a lawabiding and a normbreaking behaviour and displayed the 
latter and is, therefore guilty, but because the goals of prevention can beat- 
tained by the penal sanction for the act harmful to socetv that was display­
ed determinately, precisely because of the perpetrator’s subjective traits.
In fact, it is connecting the past with the future in the establishment 
of responsibility that means the superiority of the administration of cri­
minal justice as compared to that type of criminal justice, that type of 
calling to account, which uses only or primarily the past as a basis and im­
poses the punishment according to only the “weight of the act” and the 
“degree of guilt” independently from the future preventive goals. The 
establishment of responsibility if it is scientifically found, cannot be con­
tent with sentencing the perpetrator according to decennial or perhaps 
century old customs not paying due attention to the question, what hap­
pens to the convict, whether the sentence is fit to change the conscious­
ness of the perpetrator into the right direction or not. The opposers of the 
determinist conception well realize, that it is the problem of connecting 
the past and future, or in other words, etiological examination and prog­
nosis have here a basic role, and they object to what they recognise. In 
our conception it is not a shortcoming of calling to account on the principle 
of determinism but precisely a credit to it. Prognostication using the result 
of etiological research means the method with the help of which the pre­
ventive aims of punishment can be ensured.
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Several authors do not want to endorse consistently the principle of 
determinism in the sphere of the establishment of criminal responsibility 
bacause they see the moral basis of liability endangered by it. According 
to Földvâri, for example, if the behaviour is completely determinated, the 
moral basis of liability must be rejected. In that case punishment could be 
regarded as an expedient determinating factor but not as a means of social 
disapproval.30 I t is incomprehensible a criminal conduct, a behaviour that 
is harmful to the society to a great extent should not be also morally dis- 
approved if the perpetrator displayed it determinated by his own personal­
ity and by objective factors and not on the basis of his free will. Especialy 
so, since the basis of both penal norms and sanctions is the disapproval 
of the acts that are harmful or dangerous to the society or to the ruling 
class. Moral norms contain social expectations and requirements as it is 
the case with penal norms, only their level is different. Sanctions (disappro­
val, reprimand) are applied against those infringing moral norms the same 
way as against the violators of penal norms, only the sanctions are diffe­
rent. Of course there are other differences, too, because moral norms may 
be divergent even within the same country, but the penal norms usually 
are the same. It can happen that a penal norm is not approved of agreed 
upon by a significant part of the population, but is such case no kind of 
punishment is approved by this part should it be imposed either with an 
aim of retribution or prevention. Thus, the moral approval of a punish­
ment primarily depends on the approval of the penal norm.
The approval and observance of the dominating moral norms of a gi­
ven society necessarily means the approval and observance of the great 
majority of the penal norms since the infringement of penal norms repre­
sents a much greater harm and danger to society than that of moral ones. 
The principle of determinism comes into display in the case of the viola­
tors of moral norms the same way as it is with the perpetrators of crimi­
nal offences. Moral impeachment has preventive aims the same way as 
calling to account under criminal law or any other forms of impeachment 
do. Stigmatization, vengence, the restoration of “moral justice” cannot be 
the aim of moral conviction either. Laying the moral foundation the es­
tablishment of criminal responsibility requires “only” that the dominat­
ing moral norms and penal ones should be in accordance, penal norms 
should express the interest of the society and the members of the society 
should recognize such contents of the norms.
In connection with the moral foundation of the establishment of res­
ponsibility, we have to touch upon the opinion that Földesi discussed in 
his mentioned monography. Answering Heller’s question, whether it is 
right and just to call people to account if their will is completely deter­
minated. Földesi says: “From the point of view of the doctrine according 
to which the will is completely determinated, penal lawisunjusttoacertain 
extent when punishing intentional or negligent perpetrators, since their 
will is also completely determinated and they could not act otherwise 
than they actually did.”31
Földesi deems this unjustness a necessity at the present stage of our
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social development the same way as the system of sharing according to 
work. „While in the case of sharing according to work the equal law 
applied to inequals leads to inequality, here the inequal law (some are pu­
nished, others are not) applied to equals (everybody’s will is determined) 
creates inequality.”32
In my opinion Földesi made here a mistake concerning the difference 
in levels, for the punishment or the bonus is not the consequence of the de­
termination of the behaviour but of the quality of determination. Devot­
ed and succesful work is as much determinated as the robbery committed 
by a multiple recidivist. It can come to calling to account if the determi­
nation of the behaviour is manifest in a negative, harmful result. Even 
“unjustness to a certain extent” is out of question, since what is employed 
in the interest of the protection of the overwhelming majority, the society, 
cannot be unjust. A concrete norm of penal law or a given judicial decision 
or certain way of the execution of punishment can contain unjust ness, but 
the institution of the establisment of criminal responsibility is sociallv 
useful and just and it is a fundamental means of social coexistence and the 
forming of consciousness.
While the system of the establishment of responsibility based on the 
determinist conception is accused on the one hand of being a system of 
strict liability, on the other hand the representatives of this view are a ttri­
buted to with immense “subjectivism”. B61ya refers to the fact that ad­
mitting the aims of aducation may lead penal law to the quicksand of the 
school of social defense, since “the basis of liability is the necessity of the 
punishment, the aim of changing the perpetrator. This aim defines the 
means and it puts down the foundation of liability. Thus, everything is 
made to serve the acheivement of this aim. And since liability in this con­
ception — as it was outlined — is not able to achieve this aim in every ca­
se, other means are needed.
Culpability will be exercised from criminal liability, the next step 
will be the abandonment of criminal law, because if it is not able to acheive 
the set goal, it is not needed.”33
It is true that the representatives of the determinist conception do 
not want to take into consideration only culpability (intention and neglig­
ence) but also blameworthyness which has a much wider meaning,34 or 
recently psychical attitude.35 or, from a criminological point of view, the 
process of causality leading to the criminal offence, the network of chains 
of cause and effect and the future possibilities of the appropriate means. 
No one wants, however, to abandon criminal law, the aim only is its moder­
nization, its adaptation to the newly recognized laws. The leading ideology 
of our times and our society is dialectic and historical materialism. The 
materialist view penetrates criminal sciences and also the theory of crimi­
nal liability and it drives the remains of idealistic bourgeois views and 
institutions out of them.
As it can be seen, in the process of calling to account the determinist 
view attributes a great significance to the subject of the perpetrator to his 
psychical relation toward the penal norms and toward the harmful or dan-
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gerous consequences to society. Punishment may be imposed only if the 
future behaviour can be determinated to the better by the punishment. 
From all this logically follows that not all acts violating a penal norm may 
be followed by a punishment or by a penal measure but only those the pre­
vention of which seems feasible only by imposing a sentence. The diffe- 
rentation, the choice of the sanction applied for the violation of the norm 
can be decided in addition to the type of the violation of the norm, pri­
marily by the state of the perpetrator’s personality, the contents of his 
consciousness. In the case of some acts violating penal norms, criminal 
responsibility is not established e.g. acts by children that violate penal 
norms. There are some acts for which no sanction is applied, on the cont­
rary, they are awarded with a decoration or other tribute of respect, e.g. 
in certain cases of emergency, when a great harm can be avoided by caus­
ing a smaller one. Under the title of “circumstances excluding punisha­
bility” the Hungarian Penal Code enumerates the cases when an act 
violating a penal norm does not qualify as a criminal offence, i.e. when the 
establishment of criminal responsibility, or more correctly, the imposi­
tion of a punishment is excluded.
The aim and principles of punishment
1. The aim of punishment
The establishment of criminal responsibility, as we have seen, is to 
serve the interest of the society. The basis is the realization that the pre­
vention of human behaviour particularly harmful or dangerous to society 
can be advanced by calling to account and within this, punishment, due 
to its fitness to influence favourably the consciousness of people, is a use­
ful, expedient meens of the society.
The opinion, according to which it is in the interest of crime preven­
tion that punishment should be employed, became generally known at the 
and of the last century, when criminology came into existence. I t was the 
doctrine professing that criminality has its own laws and is determinated 
that started the debate which still is going on concerning the definition 
of the aim of punishment. The determinism of criminology and the in­
determinist classical view of criminal law and penal codes based to a sig­
nificant extent on the latter, confront each other. I do not consider my 
task to give a detailed historical retrospect of the debate and the diffe­
rent notions (from vengance to education) apearing in it. All this can be 
found in most of the monographies dealing with the subject.36 I attempt 
only to introduce the present state of the debate and legal regulation, na­
turally, stating my own position as well.
a) Retribution and prevention
It is a basic trait of the penal law of the socialist countries that their 
task is the protection of the socialist social order and their t heoretical ba-
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sis is Marxism-Leninism. In the formulation of the aims of punisment it 
is generally manifest, although the terminology of the different codes is 
different.
As to the formulation of the aims of punishment, the codes of the so­
cialist countries can be divided into two groups. There are some, that de­
fine the aims punishment as exclusively prevention,the re-education of 
perpetrators and general prevention, and there are others, that, in additi­
on to prevention, enumerate retribution as well among the aims. The ex­
amples of the former are the codes of Bulgaria and the GDR37 of the lat­
ter the Soviet38 and the Hungarian Penal Code.
In the Soviet Union, at the present, in both the literature and the in­
terpretation of the Supreme Court the opinion that the aim of the punish­
ment cannot be retribution, but only prevention, is clear.39
As far as Hungary is concerned, there are still significant differences 
in the interpretation of punishment, although the new Penal Code unam­
biguously took a stand for prevention. In spite of that, it is not without in­
terest to survey the opinions that preceded the present view that beco­
mes step by step the dominating one.
According to Art. 34. of the Penal Code of 1961 “The aim of punish­
ment is: in order to protect the society to apply a legal detriment as defi­
ned by law, to improve the perpetrator and to prevent the members of the 
society of criminality.”40
The interpretation of the rule by experts is not uniform, although 
the Motivations for the draft makes the intentions of the drafters clear. 
“The socialist state must use this means (criminal punishment J.V.) a way 
that the punishment should ensure not only the effectivity and power of 
retribution but should fit to the aim of education should be in accordance 
with the requirements of socialist humanity.” Or, in another place: “If the 
main aim of punishment, in addition to retribution, is improvement as 
well . .. ”'u On the other hand, the Commentary of the Penal Code does 
not regard the application of legal detriment as an aim of punishment and 
deems this interpretation selfevident, stating, that the socialist scholars 
of penal law agree with it almost without exeption.42
My own interpretation is, in accordance with the Motivations of the 
drafters, that the Code sets a double aim for the punishment: the applica­
tion of legal detriment i.e. retribution and prevention, i.e. restraining the 
perpetrator and other citizens from committing criminal offences. And 
this regulation cannot be qualified as inaccurate formulation, it is precisely 
an accurate reflection the experts’ and legisrators’ view of that time. The 
fact, that even nowadays there is no uniform opinion about the aim of 
punishment, speaks for this statement.
As it will be seen, there are some authors, who approve of the defini­
tion of the Code and in addition to prevention, regard retribution as the 
aim of punishment as well, while others profess that only prevention is 
the aim of punishment and demand the change of the wording and the 
abolishment of retribution as an aim. We should, therefore, examine
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whether the legal formulation of the aims of punishment and all the me­
asures that are taken on the basis of the Code in order to reach the aims, 
are in harmony with the determinist conception recognized by everyone 
at least in words, or not.
The experts who profess the so-called consistent determinism natural­
ly regard punishment as a measure to be taken for a behaviour in the past, 
a measure which is fit to shape favourably the consciousness of the per­
petrator and other individuals and that way to prevent criminal offences. 
Naming prevention as the aim of punishment, therefore, is a direct con­
sequence of the determinist conception, while retribution necessarily fol­
lows from indeterminism, from the conception of free will. Historical evo­
lution also proves that the idea of prevention comes to the fore and is 
put in the body of law even if merely as an additional aim, to the same 
extent as the determinist conception gains recognition. The idea of re­
tribution is in complete harmony with the belief in God. Pope Pius XII.
e.g. on the Rome Congress 1953 of the International Association of Penal 
Law (A1DP) emphasized in his adress the function of retribution and ato­
nement of the punishment.43
The present formulation in the Hungarian Code is the projection of 
the relative free will conception, i.e. in addition to the idea of prevention 
and education, retribution also has a position, since, according to this view, 
human behaviour is not fully only moderately determinated.
I lie authors of the book entitled “The general doctrines of penal 
law attribute a double function to punishment: a repressive and educative 
one. They identify the repressive function with the repressive aim which 
they evaluate of all in the case of graver offences. The perpetrator is iso­
lated from the society for a shorter or longer period of time and his harm­
ful influence effecting the society, is limited this way. At the same time, 
the element of general prevention exists in such penalties even to the ex­
tent that they, by the gravity of the imposed sanction, keep other people 
back from committing offences.
It means, that the punishment defined for the grave criminal offen­
ces and the one actually imposed should be fit to achieve the aims of re­
pression. For this aim primarily the longterm penalties are evailable in the 
system of punishment. Repression is a necessary and indispensable ele­
ment of the punishment but it has no dominating function.”44
According to the authors, the repressive aim of the punishment comes 
to the fore in the case of the perpetrators of grave criminal offences, ma­
inly by not letting them to pursue their criminal activity during the long 
term loss of freedom. I t can be also interpreted as keeping the dangerous 
criminals away from the society for a defined period of time in order to 
prevent the perpetration of a crime during this period. Not a word is spo­
ken, however, about the re-education of these perpetrators. “The educa­
tive special preventive element of the punishment comes to the fore par­
ticularly in the case of short-term or suspended punishment, in the case of 
corrective-educational work and fine. It does not mean, of course, that
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long-term loss of feedom, which primarily serves the aim of repression on 
the long run, would not serve the special preventive aim of punish­
ment.”45
From all this one may conclude that repression or retribution can be 
used against tiie perpetrators of grave offences, while education is applic­
able to the perpetrators of less grave offences and mainly to those having 
committed crimes the first time. A similar principle or the retributive 
character of the punishment is expressed in the division of the punitive 
measures applicable to juvenile perpetrators into the groups of measures 
and penalties. According to the Code, a punishment can be employed 
against a juvenile only if the educative measures and punishment in such 
a way emphasizes the retributiv character of punishments doubtlessly. 
(It will be discussed in detail in the following parts.)
We do not need, however, infer the opinions professing the retributive 
character of the punishment, since we can find them in a completely un­
ambiguous form. “The thesis is undeniably right, according to which the 
punishment has a double aim. On the one hand it is the application of a 
legal detriment, i.e. retribution, on the other hand, but not secondly, it 
is education, i.e. general and special prevention.” — writes Denes Bagi 
in one of his studies.46
The opinion Jozsef Földvâri concerning the retributive aim of the 
punishment is inconsistent. He denies and at the same time docs not deny 
the retributive character of the punishment. “While we exclude retribu­
tion from the aims to be achieved by the punishment, we admit that pu­
nishment means retribution in a certain sense and the perpetrator, and 
also the other members of the society, understand it as such. Punishment 
is retribution in the sense that it is imposed for a criminal offence commit­
ted previously. I t is for the perpetration of the offence that the perpetra­
tor has to suffer a smaller or greater detriment. Depending on the degree 
of the detriment the retributive character of the punishment is weaker 
or stronger. We would not deny the retributive character except for such 
measures that would be applied not for a previously committed offence 
but e.g. for a future behaviour. Such a measure, however, could not be 
regarded as a punishment because, as it will be seen later, it is a part of 
the notion of the punishment that it is applicable only for a previously 
committed criminal act. The retributive character, therefore, consists in 
the act being followed by the punishment, the detriment caused by the 
perpetrator being returned by the state with another detriment.
Thus, retribution in this sense is a part of the criminal punishment. 
I t is not an aim of punishment even in this sense. It is, however, the aim 
of the state that a punishment should follow the perpetration of the cri­
minal offence in every case, that no crime should remain unpunished wit­
hout retribution. It is necessary if or nothing else but the members of the 
society require it. Every criminal act creates shock, disapproval perhaps 
indignation in a smaller or bigger part of the population. Punishment is 
necessary even in order to calm that and it is one of its aims. Putting toget­
her all this, we can say that the state can set it as an aim that all criminal
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acts sh o u ld  be re tr ib u  ted  b y  a p p ly in g  p u n is h m e n t  in order to satisfy such 
demands of the society.’47
F ö ld v â r i regards retribution primarily as the essence of the punish­
ment and according to him retributive character is expressed in the ex­
tent of the punishment or its rigour. In other words, he identifies retribu­
tion with legal detriment which is a necessary element of the punishment. 
At the end, however, taking into account the demand of the members of 
the society for retribution, he sets as an aim of the state that all criminal 
acts should be retributed. Since the establishment of responsibility is a 
measure of the state, retribution here becomes an aim of calling to account 
realized in the punishment. The thoughts of Földvâri in which he says that 
“we would not deny the retributive character except for such measures 
that would be applied not for a previously committed offence but e.g. 
for a future behaviour” are also remarkable. F ö ld v â r i, however, does not 
relate the punishment with the perpetrator’s future behaviour, in this 
opinion the punishment is employed only for the criminal act of the past. 
In my opinion precisely this is the essential thing. It is a mistaken assump­
tion that the retributive character can be denied only if the punishment 
is applied not for a p re v io u s ly  c o m m itte d  offence but taking into account 
the expectable future behaviour. F ö ld v â r i correctly recognizes the con­
nection of the punishment without retribution and fu tu r e  behaviour, but 
he is not right in denying the connection of the p a s t  offence and the pu­
nishment without retribution. According to the determinist conneption, 
the punishment without retribution is employed precisely for the cul­
pable behaviour in the past, in order to prevent future culpable behaviour. 
It is precisely this that means the reasonable and useful aim that cal­
ling to account the perpetrator of an offence is employed for. Considera­
tion o n ly  o f  the p a s t or o n ly  o f  the fu tu r e  in connection with the punishment 
cannot be identified with the determinist conception.
The connection of the punishment with the past and future is formu­
lated also in A n d r â s  S za b o  s  work quoted before. “The social function of 
criminal liability is not retribution but prevention. If the means — caus­
ing detriment -  is regarded as an aim, if the element of coercion is exa­
mined isolately, then punishment is only retribution indeed and as such, 
regards only the past. Consequently, its educative role as a role looking 
into the future could not be spoken of. The aim of punishment is defined 
by the social function of criminal liability and it is prevention, the future 
determination of the behaviour, according to the requirements of penal 
law.”48
Considering also the demands of the population for retribution V is k i ,  
too, deems necessary the recognition of retribution as an aim of punish­
ment. “We can say that the opinion according to which the punishment 
has no retributive aim is generally accepted.” “It is doubtless, however, 
that admitting retribution as an aim of punishment has certain advanta­
ges, too.” This advantage is manifest in the fact that the punishment has 
to serve the restoration of public peace, the satisfaction of the existing 
demands of the society for punishment in such a way, however, that at the
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same time “this historically preconditioned demand should change to the 
right direction.”49
I t  is a fact that the notion of justice in the consciousness of the ma­
jority of people still is connected to the punishment proportional to the 
deed", approximatively to the principle of talion. It is natural, since even 
the great majority of the experts participating day by day in calling to 
account does not admit or accept the views concerning the determination 
of the behaviour and consequences of these views. In my opinion, however, 
the legal definition of the aim of punishment should follow the recognized 
laws of science and not the wrong ideas of the masses. The punishment 
employed with an aim of prevention can satisfy as well or better the de­
mands of the population for the punishment as the retributive one if pe­
ople are taught the basic laws of human behaviour. Mihâly Ficsor correctly 
writes in one of his studies dealing with the aim of punishment: “It is not 
the same at all that we recognize the view right in principle but take into con­
sideration the practical abstacles existing for a shorter or longer time, or, on 
the basis of pragmatist considerations, we accept the situation existing due 
to the practical obstacles, as right in principle. In  the first case we can strive 
to clear away the obstacles and after that to find  the solution that is right hi 
principle, in the latter case this perspective is lost.”50
It is not only that the legislation should put the reality into a formula­
tion but also that it should look ahead.
A legislative act with its theses and system of requirements, points 
out the directions for human behaviour. And if it is possible at all, it is 
particularly possible in formulating the aims, since the set aim necessarily 
is the anticipated norm of the future satisfaction of the present need and 
as such, it is the guideline for action. That way the preventive aim of pu­
nishment becomes an inspirer of the socially useful activity, while retri­
bution means only a show-down, settling the account, without the per­
spective of future advantages. Shargorodsky writes it rightly in this mo- 
nography published recently: “Retribution as an aim ultimately is noth­
ing else but a modern form of the primitive vengence. As long as any 
form of taking vengence can be found in the punishment, we cannot ratio­
nally dominate the administration of criminal justice.”01
It can be read frequently even in the works of socialist scholars that 
the aim of punishment is the just compensation.52 The punishment how­
ever does not compensate anyone, neither the injured party nor the 
society. It is so not only because compensation very frequently is impos­
sible (e.g. killing) but because the kinds of punishment are not fit to com­
pensate even if the character of the caused harm would make it possible. 
The present system of punishment is based on the loss of freedom penalty, 
thus it is not suitable for compensation and even fine does not serve such 
an aim.
There is a similar view when the restoration of the violated legal or­
der is named as the aim of the punishment. In the Hungarian litetature 
such opinion also can be found. E.g. according to Viski “in addition to 
special and general prevention we cannot disregard the aim of the applica-
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tion of punishment that it should restore the violated legal order, re tr i­
bute  the attack against it.”53 We could take the view of Jânos S z é k e ly ,  
too: “retribution originates from the age of private vengence. In Sicily, 
etc. it can be found in its ancient form as vendetta or blood feud. In the 
system of the punitive monopoly of the state, however, the retributive 
role of the punishment has been modified on the one hand, and on the other 
hand it had to share its monopoly as the sole aim of punishment with 
other aims: with general and special prevention and the improvement of 
the perpetrator.
In retribution the element of granting satisfaction to the injured 
party faded away by now. It is more the satisfaction of the violated sense 
of justice of the society and balancing the loss of respect caused to the 
state by violating the prohibitions prescribed by penal law (in the case of 
intentional offences) that adds the shade of retribution to the punishment 
of the present days. This seemingly self-contained protection of respect, 
however, has its own strictly rational bases as well.”54
This standpoint and the similar ones reflects a law-centric attitude, 
there is a legal order which is good, just and indisputable and if someone 
violates it, we employ a punishment against him and the attack against 
the legal order is duelv retributed. I t is nothing else but the reflection of 
the ideas of the school of positive law which was prevailing at the end of 
the last century. Just for the sake of comparison I quote the words of 
K â ro ly  E d v i  I l lé s  from that time: “From the point of view of positive law 
punishment is the external m a lu m  that the law prescribes to the perpetra­
tor of an act to be punished in order to justly retribute it and in the inte­
rest of the legal order of the state. Accordingly, the precondition of the 
punishment is the p u n is h a b le  act ( n u l la  p o e n a  s in e  e r im in e ) ,  the b a s is  of 
it is the la w  and the judicial decision based on that, the a im  of it is the just 
re tr ib u tio n  and the resto ra tio n  o f  the  violated legal o rd e r .”55
b) T h e  m e a n s  o f  p re v e n tio n
If we accept, that it is only preventive aims that the punishment may 
have, or formulating in a more general way, retribution may not be the 
aim of the punishment, which in my opinion logically follows from the 
principle of determinism, our next task is to examine what means can en­
sure the acheivent of the aim.
Prevention as the aim of punishment includes on the one handgener- 
ral prevention, i.e. keeping the citizens from committing criminal offences, 
and on the other hand special prevention, i.e. keeping the perpetrator from 
committing a new crime. These requirements define the applicable 
means and the choice of means.
The preventive aim of the punishment can be ensured by means 
that are fit to prevent behaviour that serve the satisfaction of some kind 
of need of the individual and are harmful or dangerous to society. I t is 
evident that the education the individual to comply with the social norms, 
to train people to follow the law is not the task primarily of criminal
15 ANNALES — S ectio  Iu rid ic a  — T om u s X II.
THE EFFECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DETERMİNİZM 225
law but of education in the widest sense, it is tlie task of the educative 
influence of the family, school, the place of work, friends, mass-media. 
From the point of view of special prevention, calling to account under 
penal law may have a role if the mentioned means of education did not 
ensure the observance the social requirements manifested in the penal 
norms. The general preventive effect of the punishment may prevent 
morally instable individuals from violating social requirements if their 
violation entails detrimental consequences limiting the satisfaction of 
their needs to the extent that the satisfaction that might be ensured 
by violating the penal norms is compensated. Therefore, it is primarily 
of consequences representing a detriment (malum) that general preven­
tive effect can be expected. For this reason, malum is a necessary ele­
ment of any kind of criminal punishment and belongs to its essence.
The essence also of special prevention is restrain, but as far as the 
means are concerned, in addition to the legal detriment, other means 
which are not detrimental to the perpetrator also may play a significant 
ocassionally decisive role. Restraining the perpetrator from committing 
a new offence can be helped to a great extent by causing a detriment 
which ensures general prevention and by the memories of this detriment. 
However, according to criminological studies, forming the consciousness 
by positive contents, making the perpetrator understand that the obser­
vance of social norms is also his own interest and to satisfy the individual 
needs it is a more certain way on the long run to follow the norms of 
penal law, is more satisfactory from the point of view of result. This reali­
zation resulted in the fact that education, improving the perpetrator is 
employed by most of the Penal Codes as means of punishment, especi­
ally in respect of juveniles.
In this line of reasoning education does not appear as the aim of the 
punishment but as the means of prevention. I fully agree with Shargorod- 
sky, according to whom education can be only a means, a secondary aim 
at most, of the fundamental aim of the punishment, i.e. prevention.56 
Karpets sharply criticizes Shargorodsly, stating thet punishment can 
have more than one aim, e.g. the protection of society, education, re­
tribution, etc.57
Keeping the dialectic relation of the aim and the means in mind, 
namely that every aim is the means of another one and every means is 
the aim of an activity, we have to conclude that the establishment of 
criminal responsibility and the essence of that, namely the application 
of a sanction, are to serve the protection of the society, they are the 
means of that (a different of the protection of the society e.g. the army). 
And the end of these means is the prevention of crimes which can be 
ensured by applying a legal detriment, by the education of the perpetra­
tor as a means fit to do so. Education as a basic specific aim appears as 
the aim of the execution of the punishment. The realization of the educa­
tional aims on the other hand is ensured by the means employed during 
the execution of the punishment (work, instruction, different kinds of 
occupation).
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As education cannot be regarded as the specific aim of punish ment so 
cannot the legal detriment. In the hierarchy of ends and means it is 
prevention that is on the same level as the punishment, for this is the 
most extensive, consequently the most specific task of the establishment 
of responsibility. It is similar to the chain of causality discussed earlier. 
In the long, chain-like line of causes and effects we study the section where 
the criminal offence is the effect and try  to find the factors that produced 
this effect being its causes and conditions. The same has to be done in 
the case of punishment. It is not from the point of view of the protection 
of the society nor of the implementation of punishment but f r o m  the  
p o s i t io n  o f  the p u n i t iv e  m ea su re s  th a t w e s tu d y  the a im  to be a ch ieved , a n d  
i t  i n  m y  o p in io n  c a n n o t be a n y th in g  else bu t the p r e v e n tio n  o f  c r im e .
When we examine the aim of the punishment the question fre­
quently arises what the relation of deterrence, restrain and education, 
general and special prevention with each other is. First of all, I should 
like to point out that we have two different questions here.
In the past century torture, corporal punishment, the employment 
of methods causing physical pain to the convicts, were abolished step 
by step. Thus the preventive effect ivity of the punishment was limited 
mainly to the moral denouncement entailed by the punishment, to the 
loss of freedom and to causing material and existential detriment. In the 
international literature one can easily find data showing that it is not as 
much the punishment or its quality itself that has a general preventive 
effect as the certainity of being called to account, the certainity of the 
state and moral disapproval of the recognized norm-violating behaviour.
Nigel W a lker , the well-known English criminologist publishes data 
in one of his works58, according to which 49% of the group of the juve­
niles asked referred to the opinion of the family, 22% to the loss of their 
jobs 12% the same attached to being tried at court, 10% the punishment 
to be given as the most important source of fear in case being cought. 
The opinion formulated in M. A n c e V s work entitled. The New Social 
Defence is similar to these data59. Also according to Ancel not the punish­
ment itself but “the possibility of starting a penal procedure, and its 
automatic starting itself” is the basic with-holding force. We may also 
refer here to the statement of L e n in  with similar content or to our own 
experiences. We may drew the conclusion from all this that the develop­
ment from crude’s kinds of punishment in the direction of punishments 
with educational content can be said to be right, it is in harmony with 
the laws of human behaviour, the development of social consciousness. 
So we do not need red-hot iron and punishing methods of that kind but 
such types that have an impact on the consciousness of the person beside 
the legal detriment i.e. they urge the convict to recognize penal norms 
and the relationship of the society and the individual.
But m a lu m  as a means of the prevention of crimes and as with­
holding force not only has a role in general prevention but also from the 
point of view of special prevention. The legal detriment applied as pu­
nishment, the limitation of the supply of needs may inspire the convict
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to abide by the law. General prevention does not demand the application 
of methods involving pain and the offending of human dignity and the 
requirements of special prevention do not need it all the more. The trans­
formation of the perpetrator into a law-abiding citizen is possible first 
and foremost with pedagogical methods selected on the basis of the state 
of the personality. There are some for whom warning, the deeper acknow­
ledgement of the harmful social effects of the behaviour is enough, and 
also there are such persons who need long forced education. It may occur 
that special prevention does not require any penal measures the applica­
tion of anv legal detriment already at the time of the establishment of 
the criminal responsibility as the necessary changes in the personality 
of the perpetrator have already taken place. In such cases the interests 
of special and general prevention “clash”. The opinion of the specialists 
differs as to which preventive interest should be given priority. Viski 
e.g. is of the opinion that the interest of general prevention should be limit- 
ted by the interest of special prevention. This opinion is right in as much 
as special prevention can limit the interest of general prevention, but in 
my opinion the basis must be general prevension the carving out of the 
establishment of criminal responsibility and the application of some -  
may be minimal— legal detriment anyway, because this is the basis of 
the establishment and existence of the consciousness of legal responsi­
bility. So it may occur that a punishment is implied only for general pre­
ventive reasons but there is no such case when punishment is implied 
only for reasons of special prevention. It is clear from this opinion that 
the perpetrator cannot be viewed only as himself — a single person — 
but only as a member of a collective, the society and punishment is 
applied because of the negative relationship to this collective.
It is a further point whether the legal detriment imposed can be 
considered to be a means of education. If we set out from the principles 
of general pedagogy we can say it can. As among the means of pedagogy 
we can also find discipline detriment, i.e. pedagogical punishment for 
unwanted behaviour beside fraise and recognition i.e. reward for good 
behaviour, useful action. The aim of these pedagogical measures is the 
formation of the consciousness and the personality of the young genera­
tion in the right direction. In adult age when intentional educational 
activity is much less strong or non-existent at all, the role of pedagogy is 
taken over by a system of rewards, prizes and social progress on the posi­
tive side and the system of different responsibilities and sanctions on the 
negative side. By way of analogy we can say that criminal punishment has 
the same aim in the case of adults as pedagogical ones in the case of 
naughty children. So we can be absolutely right in considering the establish­
ment of criminal responsibility in its contents to be a special pedagogical, 
criminal-pedagogical process. The pedagogical type of punishment and 
the establishment of responsibility is gaining ground nowadays not only 
in theory but also in practice, in the implementation of the punishment. 
E.g. in our country they try to adjust the implementation of the punish­
ment of loss of freedom to the pedagogical principles built on the results
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of criminal pedagogy. (National office of Implementation of Punishment 
had elaborated the basic principles of the education of the convicts 
years ago.)
'file last point I wish to explore within this circle is whether the pu­
nishment can reach its aim. In the sense that it can contribute and in 
the case of the application of adequate methods it does contribute to the 
prevention of crimes, it does reach its aim. There are many people who 
are withheld from the perpetration of a crime by the process of establish­
ing responsibility and punishment. In the case of a large percent of con­
victs the punishment has a favourable effect. But even so criminality 
exists and for a long time it will also exist. The general preventive effect 
of the punishment cannot prevent some percent of the population from 
the perpetration of crimes in the present social circumstances and at the 
present stage of the development of the human consciousness. In the 
same way punishment has no effect in the case of some convicts, it does 
not reach its preventive aim. The causes come first and foremost from 
two sorces. One is not adequate or not sufficient means of punishment, 
the other and more decisive source in the social structure and level of 
consciousness. The improvement of the penal system may contribute to 
the lessening of criminality but it cannot stop it, because there may be 
other social tendencies inducing it or these tendencies may only slowly 
loss their criminogenic effect. So the aim of the punishment is the setting 
of such an aim the realization of which is possible in the case of many 
people, many convicts, but even the system of the establishment of res­
ponsibility and that of punishment that are the most excellent from a 
theoretical point of view cannot fully realize the aim. But this does not 
mean that prevention should not be the aim of the punishment. On the 
contrary, it follows from the nature of the aim that it can be reached 
through a number of actions, and the aim cannot always be fully reached.
We may meet such opinion in the literature according to which the 
aim of the punishment cannot be decided generally, but the aims of the 
punishment can be laid out according to the structure of the perpetrators 
Tibor Horvath writes in view of the heterogenitv of the crimes and the 
perpetrators that “a) the realistic aims of the punishment depend greatly 
on the characteristic features of the types of perpetrators; b) general anil 
special prevention as the general aims of the punishment can be reached 
with education viewing the positive transformation of the personality 
in some cases and with isolation of detersent character in the case of 
other types; c) the different perpetrator types require different treat­
ment during the implementation of the punishment; d) the different 
aims of punishment and methods of treatment require different penal 
institutions.”60
A basic requirement of pedagogy has been formulated here i.e. 
different persons can be educated in different ways for reaching the same 
aim. These thoughts prove that preventive aims can be reached in a diffe­
rentiated system of punishment with individualized penalties. But it 
does not follow from this that the author laid out in item a), i.e. the
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realistic aims of the punishment depend on the characteristic features 
of the types of perpetrators. According to my opinion the a im s  are s im i ­
la r  in  the  case o f  a ll  p u n is h m e n ts ,  o n ly  the m e a n s , the m eth o d s are  d iffe re n t  
tha t ca n  lead  to  th is  a im . György A d a m  also considers it necessary to 
differentiate among the aims of the punishment according to types of 
perpetrators. In his opinion educational aims are right in the case of 
juvenile offenders, but in the case of adults the detrimental character of 
the punishment must come to he fore. He refers to the fact, that the 
personality of the child and of the juvenile offender is not fully deve­
loped, it must be educated, formed, but the adult person is already inde­
pendent, he must bear responsibility for his actions in proportion to its 
gravity. Â d â m  doubts that in the case of adults punishment with educa­
tional content may occur at all.61 In my opinion it is a basic mistake 
to limit education to childhood. Education, being educated is present 
all through our life. It is certainly true that the forms of education keep 
changing. The demands are set by the society to the child and to the 
adult in different ways. In the same way the forms of judgement, re­
warding and establishing responsibility are also different. It is also a 
fact, that direct intentional education stops with the growing indepen­
dence of the person, but I think it must be revived not only in the case 
of young convicts but also in the case of adults, if necessary. What was 
not fulfined by direct education during childhood or what was destroyed 
by adult surrounding has to be made up for, corrected during adult age 
by organized, intentional education.
As intentional education can be understood as the intensive trans­
mission of experiences about human behaviour reached or to be reached 
and that of invent ideologies, adult convicts must also be subjected to 
such processes in order to make them law-abiding citizens as soon as pos­
sible. It is both an individual and a social investment.
It is clear from waht has been said so far, that the aim of the punish­
ment is prevention. But it is also clear that punishment, the establish­
ment of responsibility cannot ensure the prevention of crime by itself, as 
criminality is of social origin first and foremost, and the prevention of 
criminality does not only depend on punishment and the establishment 
of responsibility but also on other state and social measures. So preven­
tion is not a specific aim of the punishment, as it is not the punishmnt 
exclusively and not first and foremost that must ensure the prevention 
of criminality. So although we point out prevention as the aim of the 
punishment, we must know, that punishment, establishing responsibility 
with it means only has to contribute to crime prevention. It has become 
clear during effectivity tests that neither recidivism nor the existence of 
criminality can be put down to the ineffective quality of the punishment 
and the establishment of criminal responsibility, as other factors may 
have a great (sometimes decitive role) in the formation of criminality.62
Setting out from this the aim of the punishment in a more precise 
formulation is that it should contribute with its own means to the pre­
vention of criminality both to the special and general ones.
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2. P r in c ip le s  o f  p u n is h m e n t
Penal Codes generally do not lay out the principles of punishment, 
or do not discuss them is one group.
It is undertsandable in an age when the principle of talion, the prin­
ciple of punishment proportional to the criminal act can be considered 
general, and the aim of the punishment is first and foremost retribution. 
Hut nowadays when the preventive aim is gaining ground or tends to be 
the only one accepted, when we can consider the behaviour of the per­
petrator as determinated, the principles of punishment reach much fur­
ther than the principle of proportionality to the act. If  we do not agree to 
everything with the school of social defence or the new social defence, 
we must take into consideration its principles about punishment and 
punishing methods the same way we must also consider the results of 
modern criminological research. The preventive aims of the punishment 
logically result in certain principles of punishment, to which giving a 
scientific basis as well as the elaboration of the elements of its contents 
and form is partly the task of the future. Nowadays we are rather occu­
pied by picking out those principles of punishment from the present 
ones which cannot be brought into harmony with the principles of a 
preventive aim.
1. The preventive requirement necessarily excludes all such prin­
ciples or systems of punishment which only regard “setting the account” 
for the part and does not look into the future, does not aim at the right 
determination of the future human behaviour. The punishment with a 
preventive aim is applied in order to re-socialize or socialize the prepetra- 
tor and other citizens. It follows from the principle of determinism, that 
theoretically 1) all biologically normal persons can be socialized or re­
socialized in relation to 2) time and 3) adequate circumstancial determi­
nators. But in reality we often find such perpetrators in the case of whom 
the applied measures against them did not reach the favourable effect. 
However, the failure cannot be explained with the uneducability of these 
people, but the reasons must be found in the back of an inadequateness of 
one of the above mentioned conditions. The acceptance of this view 
holds up the posibilitv for the administration of justice that instead of 
resigning to the failures one is able to find the reasons of the failure, one 
is induced to exclude them and through it to improve the system of the 
administration of justice and the society.
2. I t  follows from the punishment with a preventive aim, that the 
punishment cannot contain elements of torture, degrading human dig­
nity, because they encourage the perpetrator to stand up firmly against 
the administration of justice and social norms, they make the re-sociali- 
zation process more difficult or even prevent it.
If we recognize the importance of re-socialization, from the point of 
view of special prevention all such kinds of punishment must be dropped 
which make re-socialization impossible e.g. capital punishment such 
fines and nonfiscation of property which put the perpetrator into com-
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plete poverty, or such loss of freedom punishments that prevent the per­
petrator from having any kind of connection with the society. We have 
already mentioned that the interest of general prevention may limit the 
measures brought on the basis of special prevention. But the require­
ments listed here to which no general presentive interests are attached.
3. The coercive measures, the application of the punishment of 
loss of freedom are in the rights of all societies, because without this no 
society can be kept alive. But it is an important requirement that the 
freedom of the citizens should be limited only in such cases if it is absolu­
tely necessary, if the application of other means would not bring a favour­
able result. And even in such cases loss of freedom can only be justified 
only by the danger to the society represented by the act and by the per­
petrator himself, and by the necessity of such forced education which is 
expected to transform the consciousness of the convict.
4. The preventive aim cannot be brought into harmony with such 
penal systems, such principles of punishment which result or can result 
in outcasting the perpetrators of the society and branding them for good. 
The perpetrator is also a human being who can become a useful member of 
the society actually as a result of the help of the society. The fact that 
perpetrators are treated with the same feeling of contempt after the 
execusion of the punishment as at the time of committing the criminal 
act nowadays can actually be put down to the retributive aim and system 
of the punishment, when it is not required from the punishment to im­
prove the perpetrator to transform him into a lawabiding citizen. It does 
not generally belong to the basic tasks of the court and the whole ad­
ministration of justice to keep a record of what may the consequeces of 
the punishment be.
A criminal record as an unfavourable label accompanies a part of 
the perpetrators even after the execution of the punishment. Because 
the application of the legal detriment in these cases is not finished when 
the actual punishment is executed, or to put it in another way, more 
clearly the punishment goes on until the rehabilitation, until gaining a 
clean record.
Full legal rehabilitation does not mean also the rehabilitation of the 
colleagues at work and the micro-society. So beside an effective system 
of punishment it is necessary to change the view of the people to accept 
the perpetrations after having served their term with more understand­
ing and readiness to keep.
5. Among the principles of punishment perhaps the most discussed 
one is proportionality. The views widespread today can be very well 
seen in the work of Kadar and Kalman. “In order to make the punishment 
right and just the court must apply that punishment within the possible 
limits defined by the law which corresponds to the characteristic fea­
tures of the act and the perpetrator. A criminal act is first and foremost 
one which is dangerous to the society. Danger to the society is not only 
a basic characteristic feature of a criminal act, but it is also the basis of 
the punishment of the perpetrator. The degree of the danger to the soci-
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ety is the most important indicator showing the gravity of the act. The 
punishment must be proportioned to the danger to the society of the act, 
basically it an never be graver than this, and it can be less only if this is 
made possible by the special features in the character of the perpetrator. 
I t is here that in the socialist criminal law the requirement of the propor­
tionality of the crime and punishment is expressed, this was first laid 
out as a modern principle by bourgeoisie fighting against feudal criminal 
law”63. The quotation contains two basic ideas. One: The punishment must 
be in proportion to the crime — apart from some exceptions, two: it is a 
basic socialist principle although it was laid out by progressive bour- 
geisie.
The punishment system proportional to the criminal act is criticized 
nowadays from many sides. Some authors in the Hungarian literature64 
Avant to give a greater role to the personality of the perpetrator in the 
course of imposing the punishment. On the other hand others only consi­
der the proportionate punishment as good. E.g. György Âdâm in one 
of his articles in the discussion65 justifies the existence of punishment 
proportional to the act with the requirement of proportionality present 
everywhere in the society (e.g. wages proportionate to work). In my 
opinion in our case we do not speak of proportionality in general, but of 
proportionality to the damage or harm caused by the act. The same way 
theoretically the punishment may be proportional to the degree of 
socialization of the person as with the gravity of the criminal act. Rea­
soning for proportionality in itself is not enough all the more because I 
have never met anyone in the literature negating proportionality in 
general. The core of the matter is to what the punishment (or we may 
mention income as well) should be proportional. The differentiation of 
proportionality is common in every field of social life. Contrary to the 
statement of Âdâm even sharing is not only proportionality to work and 
even in socialism the yard stick is not only work. The socialist principles 
are more just than this and as a result of social development they will 
be even more so, because a large part of the national income is distri­
buted according to the needs of the citizens (social insurance, family 
allowance etc.). So the socialist state does not realize the “equality of the 
bourgeoise concept” but it puts into practice its aim “Socialist” ideas of 
equality step by step. So we cannot agree to the view of Âdâm explaining 
the tasks of law among socialist circumstances. “Last of all socialism 
does not and cannot have any other achievement in the field of law but 
what has been stated by progressive bourgeoisie has got to be put into 
practice the real contents of by it. The socialist basis in law is never 
different from putting into practice the principles laid out (but never 
achieved) by progressive bourgeoisie.”66
It is a fact that many such principles are put into practice in socia­
lism which were laid out by progressive bourgeoisie. But to reduce the 
aims, tasks of law among our circumstances only to this would lead to 
preserving the remnants of capitalism and serining them instead of the 
further development of the achievements of socialism. In penal procedure
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it would mean that the indeterministic views of classical criminal law has 
to be defended against the deterministic views of materialism and we 
must change the views for bourgeoise ones. Progressive bourgeoisie built 
its theory of the establishment of criminal responsibility on the concept 
of indeterminism, idealism, so it applied a punishment proportional to 
the criminal act for paying for the past, the criminal act. I ’am convinced 
that socialist criminal law, socialist administration of justice has a higher 
aim than this one. Taking into consideration the new results in studying 
the laws of human behaviour it does n o t fo l lo w  f r o m  the 'p r in c ip le  o f  deter­
m in i s m  th a t p u n is h m e n t  p ro p o r tio n a l to the  act m  n st he changed  fo r  a  sy s tem  
in  w h ich p u n is h m e n t  is  adequa te  to  the p e r s o n a li ty , bu t th a t beside the da m ages  
a n d  h a rm  ca u sed  b y  the act a lso  the p e r s o n a li ty  o f  the p erp e tra to r  m u s t  be 
co n sid ered  together w ith  the p o s s ib il i ty  o f  re -so c ia lisa tio n  the ty p e  a n d  a m o u n t  
o f  the  p u n is h m e n t  m u s t  be d e fin e d  w ith  c o n s id e r in g  g enera l p re v e n tio n  a s  well.
Undoubtedly there is some correlation between the gravity of the 
act and the degree of the danger to the society and antisocial attitudes 
represented by the perpetrators. So in a certain percent of the cases there 
will be a correlation between the giavity of the act and the punishment 
even if we give up the hegemony of the application of the principle of 
punishment proportional to the criminal offence. In order to avoid mi­
sunderstandings I stress it again that the c r im in a l  o ffen ce  ca n n o t be n eg ­
lected in  the course o f  im p o s in g  the p u n is h m e n t ,  because th a t it the s ta r tin g  
p o in t  o f  the e s ta b lish m e n t o f  c im in d i  r e s p o n s ib il i ty  th a t is  w h y  w e a p p ly  
so m e  m e a su re  o f  p u n is h m e n t  a g a in s t the  p erp e tra to r . B u t  w ha t k in d  o f  
p u n is h m e n t  is  im p o se d  c a n n o t o n ly  be dec ided  o n  the b a sis  o f  the g ra v ity  
o f  the c r im in a l  o ffen ces , a lso  the p e r s o n a li ty  o f  the  p e rp e tra to r  h is  degree o f  
so c ia liza tio n  a n d  the c o n d itio n s  o f  re -so c ia liza tio n  m u s t be ta k e n  in to  c o n s i­
d e ra tio n  w ith  eq u a l or so m e tim e s  greater w eigh ts. We can then say, let the 
punishment be proportional not only to the actions of the past but also 
the consequences of the favourable determination of the future.
The necessity of the maintenance of the principle of punsihment 
proportional to the offence is explained by the fact that this is the one 
that corresponds to the feeling of justice of the population i.e. this is what 
the population considers to be just. Except for specialist with up-to-date 
ideas the feeling of justice of the population is really based on punishment 
imposed on the basis of the gravity of the criminal offence. It became 
specially evident during recent years when in connection with some grave 
criminal offences thousands of letters sent to the authorities claimed a 
“just” punishment (death for death). I t is natural because people have 
heard and read all through their lives that the just punishment is the 
one that is imposed proportionately to the gravity of the offence. All the 
more because it is a right of the perpetrator to be able to calculate the 
consequences of his offence (in days of loss of freedom or in the amount 
of money).
I t does not follow from all this that if we recognize that there is a 
better, more effective principle from that of the one based on propor­
tionality between the punishment and gravity oft he offence, we must stick
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to the old one as the 2>opulation does so. On the contrary the population 
must be convinced about the deeper truth, they must be taught the laws 
of human behaviour, the role of the praise and detriment and their essen­
ce, then the feeling of justice of the population will also change. The gra­
dual implementation of new principles of punishment make it possible, 
that the people should not contradict them. It may occur though that 
the way to the application of the new principles is not quite smooth. This 
must be taken into consideration because the fight between the old and 
the new remains a fight even in its weakest form. And in my opinion this 
fight causes more problems in professional circles than among laymen, as 
for professionals these leading principles in their everyday work.
6. A further requirement in punishment is that the interests of the 
perpetrator should be taken into consideration through the interests of 
that small circle of people to which the perpetrator belongs, if he belongs 
to one like that at all. As the punishment is a detriment not only for the 
perpetrator but also for his family and perhaps his working collective. 
I t is hardly possible to elaborate such a penal system that would not be 
detrimental to the family in general, especially if the convict is a parent. 
The loss of income parental supervision and care, the shame attached to 
the conviction of the present are all such detriments that generally effect 
the innocent, too. In such cases the question whether the conviction is 
just, is really justified. Undoubtedly the criminal punishment often in­
fluences the family of the convict sometimes even their future prospects 
in a detrimental way.
But in my opinion this is not first and foremost a question of the pu­
nishment but it is a problem of the general official social judgement a t­
tached to the punishment and the convict. Unjust ethical eonsempt to­
wards the relations of the convict as well as and the isolation the breaking 
up of earlier connections going together with it is often a consequence. 
It follows from social coexistence that one is not only responsible for his 
own deeds but bears some kind of responibility also for the collective he 
belongs to. So this ethical contempt is just in proportion to such respon­
sibility, but only to such an extent. Among our circumstances the requi­
rement of proportionality is not made quite clear and it has not yet be­
come part of common conviction of the people. So the punishment may 
often have unjust consequences for some relations. E.g. a young child 
cannot be made responsible for the criminal behaviour of its father or 
mother. So the society must strive that the negative behaviour of the pre­
sents should not be drawback for the child. In my opinion we can make 
a step forward here with the change of social prejudice, the way of think­
ing of the people and with more effective organized social measures. But 
the unjust detriment towards the relations and the collective is unavoid­
able in certain cases and to a certain extent. So the knowledge of this 
can improve the adaption to social requirement and the mutual feeling 
of responsibility in the family and in the collective.
A part of the above mentioned principles of punishment can be 
found among the slogans of humanisation of the représentât ivcs of prog-
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ressive bourgeoise trends.67 The derivation of the principles of punish­
ment from the principle of humanism in my opinion is scientifically not 
fully founded. As in the original meaning of humanism it expresses and 
defends certain rights, interests and dignity of the individual. The prin­
ciple of materializm together with socialism means much more than that 
because beside the interests of the individual it also stresses the interests 
of the collective, i.e. the majority over the individual. So it becomes clear 
that the basic human rights of the individual are not inherited but they 
are defined by the interest of the collective. The rights and obligations 
of single people, individuals depend on the given social system, social 
organisation and political principles. So also in our society the rights and 
obligations of the people are derived from the principles of socialism, 
materialism and determinism, finally from the social reality the laws of 
development. So the system of punishment and those forms of punishment 
can be considered to be right which transform the perpetrators according 
to the interest of the majority recognizing the social development, and 
which are adequate to form and maintain a right feeling of responsibility 
in law-abiding citizens.
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КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ДЕТЕРМИНИЗМА И УГОЛОВНОЕ ПРИВЛЕЧЕНИЕ 
К ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТИ
Проф. д-р Й О Ж ЕФ  ВИГ
По автору, ответственность это отношение индивида и общества или членов 
общества. Содержание ответственности заключается в какой-то обязанности инди­
вида, которую он может реализовать с ответствием или опасно на общество, встре­
чаясь с уголовными нормами.
Против общего понимания статья говорит что привлечение к ответственности 
может наступать в обоих случаях. Из первого случая может следоваться признание, 
похвалы быть может награждение, а из второго случая неодобрение, принуждение,
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наказание. Значит, уголовная ответственность и уголовное привлечение к ответст­
венности не тождественны. Первая может существовать и без второго.
Исходя из концепции детерминизма, цель у г о л о в н о г о  привлечения к ответст­
венности может только превенция. Итак, на совершителя преступления н у ж н о  наз­
начить или применять наказание или меру наказания подходящие для осуществления 
и генеральной и специальной превенции. В таком понимании наказание это средство 
детерминации будущего подходящего поведения людей и осужденных.
Каждые формы наказания и всю у г о л о в н у ю  систему н у ж н о  оценить с точки 
зрения их применимости к обеспечению или способствованию их осуществлению.
Вот так связываются на основе концепции детерминизма действия прошедшего, 
возможности и возможные события будущего.
DIE DETERMINISTISCHE KONZEPTION UND DIE STRAFRECHTLICHE 
VERANTWORTLICHMACHUNG
D R. JÖ Z SEF V IG H
U niversitätsprofessor
(Zusam menfassung)
Der Meinung des Verfassers nach ist die V erantw ortung ein, zwischen dem  Individum  
und der Gesellschaft oder deren  M itglieder bestehendes V erhältnis. Ih r  In h a lt ist irgendei­
ne V erpflichtung der E inzelperson der sie au f  eine verantw ortungsvolle  oder u n v eran tw o rt­
liche Weise, gegen die S trafnorm en verstossend, au f eine gesellschaftsgefährliche A rt nach- 
konnnen kann . Abweichend von der allgem einen Auffassung k an n  es — la u t der S tudie — 
in beiden Fällen zur V erantw ortlichm achung kom m en. Im  ersten  F all kann  die Folge die 
A nerkennung, die Belobung, eventuell die Belohnung sein, wobei im zw eiten F all etw a 
die Missbilligung, die V erurteilung, die Strafe. Die strafrech tliche V eran tw ortung  ist also 
n ich t m it der strafrechtlichen V erantw ortlichm achung identisch. Die erstere  kann  auch 
ohne der lezteren bestehen.
Das Ziel der strafrechtlichen V erantw ortlichm achung kan n , ausgehend von der de­
term inistischen K onzeption, n u r die P revention sein. D araus folgt, dass n u r solche S trafe  
oder Strafregeln dem  T ä te r auferlegt werden dürfen, die gleicherweise die generelle und 
auch die spezielle P reven tion  sichern. In diesem Sinne sei die S trafe nichts anderes, als ein 
M ittel für die D eterm inierung der richtigen Verhaltensweise der M enschen, fü r das zu­
künftige richtige V erhalten der V erurteilten.
Jede  einzelne S tra fa rt, aber auch das ganze S trafsystem  m uss von  dem G esichtspunkt 
bew ertet w erden, wieweit sie zur Sicherung der p reventiven Ziele oder zur F örderung  ih rer 
D urchsetzung geeignet sind.
So verknüpfen sich die Ereignissen der V ergangenheit, au f G rund der determ in is­
tischen K onzeption, m it den M öglichkeiten der Z ukunft, m it ihren m utm asslichen E reig­
nissen.
THE EFFECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DETERMİNİZM 239
